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Introduction
In the San Francisco cityscape on a very clear day, from certain van-
tage points you might catch a glimpse of it. It blends into the surrounding
[1591
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trees, coquettishly concealing its true form. It has been there for 63 years.
It is the cross on Mount Davidson.
In 1992, a constitutional attack1 was launched against this concrete
and steel structure which stands 103 feet tall and 39 feet wide, the largest
Latin Cross 2 on the American continents. The plaintiffs viewed the cross
as a symbol of majoritarian intolerance and sought its destruction or re-
moval. Surprisingly, among the San Francisco citizens who brought the
action were several religious leaders and groups.3 The plaintiffs contended
that the ownership of the cross by the City of San Francisco violated the
United States Constitution's Establishment Clause4 as well as the No Pref-
erence Clause of the California Constitution.5 Accordingly, the district
court considered the cross under both California and federal precedent.
The court determined that the cross's historical significance, physical set-
ting, and cultural aspects distinguished the Mount Davidson Cross from
other religious symbols on public land that had recently been found uncon-
stitutional. 6 After a thorough discussion, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment for San Francisco and allowed the cross to stand.7
Unsatisfied, the plaintiffs brought an appeal before the Ninth Circuit,
and there obtained the ruling they sought.8 The appellate court, mechani-
cally applying the No Preference Clause analysis introduced in Ellis v. City
of La Mesa,9 declared that the display violated the California Constitu-
1. See Carpenter v. City and County of San Francisco, 803 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(finding that the cross did not violate state or federal constitutions and entering summary judg-
ment for the city).
2. The Latin cross is characterized by an upright or vertical bar crossed near the top by a
shorter horizontal bar. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1018 (3d ed. 1996).
3. See Carpenter v. City and County of San Francisco, 93 F.3d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1250 (1997).
4. The Establishment Clause, along with the Free Exercise Clause, is found in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....." U.S. CONST.
amend. L
5. The California Constitution states: "Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without
discrimination or preference are guaranteed.... The Legislature shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." CAL CONST. art. I, § 4. The constitution further prohibits financial
aid and grants of personal or real property from government agencies to religious organizations or
for any religious purpose whatever. "[No government agency in California shall] ever make an
appropriation, or pay from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any relig-
ious sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose; nor shall any grant or donation of personal property
or real estate ever be made ... for any... sectarian purpose whatever." CAL CONST. art. XVI, §
5.
6. See 803 F. Supp. at 340-41, 349 n.16.
7. See id. at 352.
8. See Carpenter, 93 F.3d at 627.
9. 990 F.2d 1518, 1524-25 (9th Cir. 1993).
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tionY° The City of San Francisco appealed the ruling to the United States
Supreme Court. While awaiting the Court's decision on granting certio-
rari, the San Francisco Landmarks Preservation Advisory Board, in an ef-
fort to save the cross from demolition, voted unanimously on January 15,
1997, to bestow landmark status on the Mount Davidson Cross."1 The
change in status was not enough to convince the Court to hear the case, and
certiorari was denied on March 17, 1997.12 Public reaction in San Fran-
cisco and across the nation reflected support for the cross and a desire to
save what had become an icon.13 But even the cross's biggest allies real-
ized that the Supreme Court's decision meant the cross had to be sold or
removed.
14
At the south end of the San Francisco Bay lies the City of San Jose.
There, city officials spent $500,000 of public funds to commission the
creation of an eight-foot statue. The entity to be memorialized: Quetzal-
10. See Carpenter, 93 F.3d at 632. On the same day Carpenter was decided, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the City of Eugene violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion by its ownership and display of a 51-foot Latin cross in a public park in Separation of
Church and State Committee v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617 (1996).
For a novel commentary on the Carpenter decision, see Terry Kay Diggs, Dirty Harry, the
Mount Davidson Cross and Symbols in Conflict, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 24, 1996, Second Edi-
tion, at A17.
11. See Henry K. Lee, Mount Davidson Cross Called Landmark by Panel, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 16, 1997, at A17.
12. See City and County of San Francisco v. Carpenter, 117 S. Ct. 1250 (1997).
13. See Joan Ryan, At Cross Purposes: Historic Value of Mount Davidson Icon Equal to
Sectarian Value, Neighbors Say, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 19, 1997, at A17; see also Historic and Re-
ligious: The Old Rugged Cross, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 18, 1997, at B4 ("It was a remarkably
intolerant argument to make in a city that prides itself on tolerance.... The quest for cultural
sensitivity does not mean cities must be culturally sanitized."). But cf. Stephanie Salter, Chris-
tians Don't Need a Municipal Cross to Bear, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 23, 1997, at C15 ("As a fol-
lower of the Christian faith and a member of the American Civil Liberties Union, I'd like to thank
the folks who went after a huge concrete symbol of religion in order to preserve a less tangible
but equally important symbol of freedom.").
14. See Reynolds Holding, S.F. Loses Legal Fight for Cross, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 18, 1997,
at Al. The cross and the 0.38 acre it stands upon were sold at auction on July 21, 1997 to the
Council of Armenian American Organizations of Northern California for $26,000. The group
was incorporated just days before the auction with the purpose of preserving the cross for the
community and as a memorial for the Armenians killed in the Ottoman Turk genocide. See Ger-
ald D. Adams, Mount Davidson Cross Sale Monday, S.F. EXAMINER, July 19, 1997, at Al. The
sale was ratified by 68% of San Francisco voters in the November 4, 1997 election. See San
Francisco Election '97: Bay Area Results, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 5, 1997, at A16.
In anticipation of the vote, the attorney for the Armenian Council promised that "the cross
will be preserved and open to the public." See Gerald D. Adams, S.F. Cross Saved in Auction.
S.F. EXAMINER, July 22, 1997, at A3. Community reaction has been positive, since the cross will
remain in place; that was exactly the result many were hoping for. See id. However, the contro-
versy is still not over. On September 22, 1997, an atheistic group sued to enjoin the sale con-
tending that the transaction was a sham due to stipulations in the deed of sale. See William Carl-
sen, Atheist Groups Sues S.F. Over Cross, S.F. CRON., Sept. 23, 1997, at A22.
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c6atl, the Plumed Serpent God of the Aztec civilization.15 San Jose sought
to represent the multicultural population of the city. 16 The same year that
the statue was erected, San Jose voluntarily removed its annual Nativity
scene in response to citizen complaints.17 Citizens objected to the
$200,000 of public funds that went into the yearly Christmas display,18
which included secular symbols such as snowmen, reindeer and winter
scenes as well as the Nativity. Interestingly, the Quetzalc6atl statue and
the Christmas display were both located in the same park, the Plaza de
C6sar Chavez.
19
The situation angered Christians, who protested the removal of a tra-
ditional Christmas symbol. The commemoration of a deity whose history
entailed extensive human sacrifice added injury to the insult.2 The city's
decisions also angered non-religiously motivated residents, who balked at
the statue's price tag.21 Despite the citizen protest against the sculpture of
Quetzalc6atl, San Jose went ahead with its plan. A group of San Jose citi-
zens sought an injunction against the city to prevent the installation of the
statue.22 In the order denying the injunction, U.S. District Judge James
Ware devoted only three sentences to the constitutionality of the statue:
After having viewed the sculpture and heard counsels' arguments,
the Court finds that the Plumed Serpent is an artistic representation
15. Quetzalc6atl is one of the great gods of the Aztec Pantheon, recognized as the Feathered
Serpent,God of Learning and of Priesthood, and was the principal deity of the city of Cholula.
See GEORGE C. VAILLANT, AZTECS OF MEXICO 148 (1962). Quetzalc6atl is known for bringing
spiritual awareness and enlightenment to the indiginous peoples of America. See TONY
SHEARER, LORD OF THE DAWN: QUETzALc6ATL (1971) (Quetzalc6atl's "voice trumpets out of
Mexico's past, it is sung by the Chicanos, Mexican Americans, Mexican Indians.... The phi-
losophy of Quetzalc6atl shall be done on Earth."); see also FRAY DIEGO DURAN, BOOK OF THE
GODS AND RITES AND THE ANCIENT CALENDAR 130 (1971) ("This god Quetzalc6atl was adored
in all the villages of the land, especially in Cholula, where he stood on a loft and prominent tem-
ple, in whose courtyard the Marqus del Valle, Don Hernando Cortds, ordered a massacre of five
hundred natives.").
16. See Alvarado v. City of San Jose, No. CV 94-20773 JW, 1994 WL 655404, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 16, 1994). The population of San Jose is 26.6% Latino. See San Jose Chamber of
Commerce Statistics (1996).
17. See Jamie Beckett, Praise and Protest as Quetzalcdatl Statue Unveiled, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 19, 1994, at B10.
18. The San Jose Nativity scene was purchased with private monies and donated to the City
of San Jose. See Linda Chavez, Multiculturalism Now Our "Religion," COuRIER-JOURNAL, Dec.
11, 1994, at4D.
19. For a stinging editorial on the controversy, see Frank M. Luna, Kerman, "Dogma" on
Display, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 2, 1994, at B4 ("[J]udicial consistency, fairness, and objectivity
gives way to political chicanery when the revered Quetzalc6atl is given a prominent and civic
place to display his 'positive cultural image,' as deemed by supporters. Apparently, the separa-
tion of church and state applies only to certain groups in America.").
20. See Beckett, supra note 17.
21. See Id.
22. See Alvarado, No. CV 94-20773 JW, 1994 WL 665404 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 1994).
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of an ancient civilization and is not a religious object. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of success on the merits.
The City's installation of the Quetzalcoat sculpture does not violate
any constitutional provision. 2
After failing to prevent its installation, the plaintiffs brought suit
against the city in an attempt to have the statue removed.2 The plaintiffs
contended that the installation and maintenance of the Plumed Serpent God
statue in a city park was a violation of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment or the California Constitution and the No Preference
Clause of the California Constitution, the same attack that succeeded in the
Mount Davidson Cross case?2 In its order granting summary judgment for
the city, the district court commended the "artistic, cultural, historic, and
educational value" of the statue and found that it enhanced the sense of
community among San Jose residents.26 The court stated that "[r]eligious
significance [by itself] is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation." z
Therefore, the court found no violation of the state constitution.2
On appeal,29 the Ninth Circuit characterized the Plumed Serpent God
statue as non-religious and briefly applied the lenient Establishment Clause
standard established in Lemon v. Kurtzman.30  The court dismissed the
more restrictive No Preference analysis which had been used by the court
in finding the Mt. Davidson Cross unconstitutional. 31 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed,32 and the statue remains in Ces r Chavez Plaza.
In this starkly inconsistent application of religion clause analysis,
there lies a message. The message sent by striking down the Mount Da-
vidson Cross (a majoritarian religious symbol) while upholding the Quet-
23. Id. at*2.
24. See Alvarado v. City of San Jose, No. CV 94-20773 JW, 1995 WL 66785 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 10, 1995).
25. See id. at *2.
26. See id. at *3.
27. Id. at *2.
28. See id. at *4.
29. See Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1996).
30. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under Lemon, a statute or practice that touches upon religion
must (1) have a secular purpose; (2) neither advance nor inhibit religion in its primary effect; and
(3) not foster excessive entanglement with religion. See id. at 612-13. The Alvarado court noted
that "[t]hough much maligned by scholars and various Justices, Lemon has never been overruled,
and the Lemon test is the one applied in this circuit." 94 F.3d at 1231. The Court also discussed
O'Connor's "endorsement test" first mentioned in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-692
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (holding that the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island did not vio-
late the Establishment Clause by erecting a creche in its annual Christmas display, despite its re-
ligious significance). O'Connor sought to clarify the Lemon test by focusing on institutional en-
tanglement and on endorsement or disapproval of religion. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689.
31. See 94 F.3d at 1232-33.
32. See id. at 1233.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
zalc6atl statue (a religious symbol of a political minority) is one of intoler-
ance; or, rather, it is a new-found tolerance only for traditionally non-
majoritarian values and ideologies. The Federal Constitution affirmatively
mandates not merely tolerance, but accommodation, and forbids hostility
toward any religion.33 These constitutional guarantees should protect ma-
joritarian religions just as they protect minority religions. 34  The law
should apply equally to protect or to strike down these displays, regardless
of denomination.
This Note will criticize the Ninth Circuit's inconsistent and conflict-
ing analysis 35 in Carpenter and Alvarado, analyze the appropriate factors
to consider in Religion Clause cases under both the United States and Cali-
fornia Constitutions, and suggest a more consistent approach to Religion
Clause cases in light of the increasingly pluralistic society of the United
States and, in particular, California.
I. Applicable Federal and State Standards
The Establishment Clause, along with the Free Exercise Clause, is
found in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ,"6 The Establishment
Clause was written into the Constitution to "prevent any national ecclesi-
astical establishment .... It was intended to guard against political di-
visiveness along religious lines. 8
Similarly, the California Constitution prohibits governmental estab-
lishment of religion, ensures the free exercise of religion, and mandates
that no preference be given to any one religion. Article I, section 4 pro-
vides: "Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or
33. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1952))
("Anything less [than affirmative accommodation] would require the 'callous indifference' [the
Court has] said was never intended by the Establishment Clause"); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948) ("[Hostility against any religion would be at] war
with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free exercise of
religion.").
34. See Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1230 (stating that "the First Amendment must be held to pro-
tect unfamiliar and idiosyncratic as well as commonly recognized religions" but concluding that
"it loses all its sense and thus its ability to protect when carried to the extreme .... I).
35. For further commentary on consistency in this area, see David Felsen, Comment, Devel-
opments in Approaches To Establishment Clause Analysis: Consistency for the Future, 38 AM.
U. L. REV. 395 (1989).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37. 3 Joseph Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §1871
at 728 (1833).
38. See Paul A. Freund, Comment, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1680, 1692 (1969).
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preference are guaranteed., 39 Article XVI, section 5 further prohibits fi-
nancial aid and grants of personal or real property to religious organiza-
tions or for any religious purpose whatever.4 This clause is commonly re-
ferred to as the "Ban on Aid to Religion." California courts have
interpreted the state constitution as being more protective of the principle
of separation than the federal guarantee.
41
A. The Federal Establishment Clause: Lemon v. Kurtzman and its
Progeny
The United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly emphasized [its]
unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in th[e] sensitive
area [of Establishment Clause jurisprudence]." 42 The United States Su-
preme Court has acknowledged that Establishment Clause language in the
United States Constitution is "at best opaque" and that it "can only dimly
perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of
constitutional law. 43 The Court in Lynch v. Donnelly wrote, "[i]n our
modem, complex society, whose traditions and constitutional underpin-
nings rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas, an abso-
lutist approach in applying the Establishment Clause is simplistic and has
been uniformly rejected by the Court."44
The Court, interpreting the First Amendment, has used various tests in
Establishment Clause analysis.45 During the past three decades, the Su-
preme Court has tentatively applied the three-prong test established in
Lemon v. Kurtzman46 and clarified in Lynch,47 the so-called Lemon test.
The Court in Lemon identified "three main evils against which the
Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, fi-
nancial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activ-
ity." '48 The Court devised a three-prong test to ensure that thaese evils are
39. CAL CONST. art. I, § 4.
40. See Cal. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
41. See, e.g., Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991); Hewitt v.
Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1566-67 (9th Cir. 1991); Okrand v. City of Los Angeles, 207 Cal. App.
3d 566, 569 (1989).
42. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (citations omitted). See also, Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989) (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring))
("'[T]he myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be eroded' are not sus-
ceptible to a single verbal formulation .... ).
43. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612 (1971).
44. 465 U.S. at 678.
45. See DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH-STATE CONSTrrTTIONAL ISSUES: MAKING SENSE
OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 1-50 (1991).
46. 403 U.S. 602.
47. 465 U.S. 668.
48. 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,668 (1970)).
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avoided: to be constitutionally permissible, a statute or government prac-
tice that touches upon religion must (1) have a secular purpose;49 (2) nei-
ther advance nor inhibit religion in its principal effect; 50 and (3) not foster
an excessive entanglement with religion.
51
In Lynch,52 the Court emphasized that "no fixed, per se rule can be
framed ' 53 and stressed that religious displays must be analyzed within the
context they are found.M
Justice O'Connor's often cited concurrence attempted to clarify and
expand the Lemon test's purpose and effect prongs.55 The proper inquiry,
she argued, should not be limited by a finding that a secular purpose exists,
but should consider whether the government's actual purpose is to endorse
or disapprove of religion. 6 Further inquiry should also be made as to
whether, despite the government's actual permissible purpose, the practice
in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.57
B. California's "No Preference" and "Ban on Aid to Religion" Clauses
The California Supreme Court has not addressed the subject of relig-
ious symbols on public land since its 1978 decision in Fox v. City of Los
Angeles. 8 There, a city taxpayer brought suit against the city to enjoin the
49. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75-77 (1985) (striking down an Alabama law man-
dating a period of silence in public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer" and concluding
that the statute had no secular purpose).
50. "A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion,
which is their very purpose. For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must be fair to
say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence."
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987) (emphasis in original). "The constitutional requirement of 'primary
secular effect' has ... become a misnomer; while retaining the earlier label, the Court has trans-
formed it into a requirement that any non-secular effect be remote, indirect and incidental."
LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-10 at 1215 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis
in original).
51. See 403 U.S. at 612-13. There are five entanglement doctrines applicable under the Es-
tablishment Clause: "(1) In challenges to government action.., the action is unconstitutional if
it creates excessive administrative entanglement between church and state .... (2) [T]he action
is also unconstitutional if it turns over traditionally governmental powers to religious institutions.
... (3) [Ihe challenged action is subjected to stricter scrutiny if it breeds religiously based po-
litical diviseness. (4) In seeking a religiously based exemption from a law or regulation, a party
may be able to prevail... by showing that enforcement would create excessive administrative
entanglement. (5) Courts and other agencies of government may not inquire into pervasively re-
ligious issues." TRIBE, supra note 50, § 14-11 at 1226-27.
52. 465 U.S. 668.
53. Id at 678.
54. See id. at 679-80.
55. See id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. See id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. See id.
58. 587 P.2d 663 (Cal. 1978).
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illumination of a "huge" cross placed on the Los Angeles City Hall on
Christmas and both Latin and Eastern Orthodox Easter Sundays.59 The
court held that the lighting of the cross, "a symbol particularly pertinent to
the Christian religion," 6 was unconstitutional under the California No
Preference Clause and both California and Federal Establishment
Clauses. 61 The court explicitly stated that the "case is marked by the loca-
tion, size, and visibility of the Los Angeles cross." 62 The city, although
permitted to "depict objects with spiritual content ... may not promote or
give its stamp of approval to such spiritual content."
63
The placement of the cross on the actual city hall building was influ-
ential to the court: "The city hall is not an immense bulletin board
whereon symbols of all faiths could be thumbtacked or otherwise dis-
played."64 The court concluded that by placing the cross on city hall, it ap-
peared that Los Angeles was stamping its approval on the Christian faith.65
Further, the cross was large enough to be and located such that it was
"visible for many miles in many directions" 66 when illuminated. This was
important to the court because people not participating in the holidays
could see the cross, but not the secular symbols that accompanied the cross
during the holidays.
67
Turning to the California No Preference Clause,68 the court noted that
the California Constitution does not require that each religion always be
represented.69 The court concluded that illuminating "only the Latin cross,
however, does seem preferential when comparable recognition of other re-
ligious symbols is impracticable."70 The court noted that the illumination
was in direct response to demands from members of the Christian faith.71
59. See id. at 663-64.
60. Id. at 664.
61. A concurring opinion stated that the practice violated the Ban on Aid to Religion Clause.
See id. at 668 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
62. Id. at 665.
63. l at 666 (citing Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
64. 587 P.2d at 665.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 664.
67. See id.
68. See supra note 5.
69. See 587 P.2d at 665.
70. Id. The court cited Evans v. Selma Union High Sch. Dist., 222 P. 801 (Cal. 1924), to
distinguish the present illumination of the cross on City Hall from the maintenance of religious
texts in a public school library.
71. See 587 P.2d at 664. The court took judicial notice of city reports stating, "the Ortho-
dox request for an Easter cross 'does appear to conflict with the spirit of said policy,' though not
with 'the letter."' Id. at 665. Also considered in evidence were citizen letters to the city council
expressing gratitude for "the acknowledgement shown the Orthodox faith by having the symbol
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The Los Angeles City Council's motion authorizing the cross in 1973 ex-
plicitly spoke of "an illuminated cross to commemorate Eastern Orthodox
Easter."72 This was enough to find that the city was granting a preference
to one religion.
The concurrence pointed out that public funds were expended to
maintain and illuminate the cross during the holidays. 73 According to the
director of the bureau of public buildings, the cost for lighting the cross for
Christmans 1975 was to be $103. This expenditure of tax revenue would
violate the California Ban on Aid to Religion Clause.74
More recently, in Okrand v. City of Los Angeles,75 the California
Court of Appeal considered whether Los Angeles violated either the
United States or the California Constitution by displaying an unlit menorah
near a decorated Christmas tree in the rotunda of its city hall.
The court found that the menorah satisfied all three prongs of the
Lemon test: The menorah had the secular purpose of education due to its
extensive history and artistic value,76 it did not advance religion in its prin-
cipal effect,77 and it did not foster an excessive governmental entanglement
with religion.78 Furthermore, the menorah did not violate the California
No Preference Clause because it was displayed with other symbols of re-
ligion and culture, and therefore granted no preference to the Jewish
faith. 79 Los Angeles did not expend public funds to maintain the menorah,
so the California Ban on Aid to Religion clause was not implicated.80
In Ellis v. City of La Mesa,81 the Ninth Circuit held that San Diego's
ownership of the 36-foot tall Mount Helix Cross and the 43-foot tall Mount
Soledad Cross, both situated in public parks, violated the No Preference
Clause of the California Constitution. 2 There, the Ninth Circuit held the
relevant factors in determining whether a display violates the California
Constitution are: "(1) the religious significance of the display, (2) the size
of Christianity, the cross, displayed on the four sides of the city hall building on the eve of our
Easter." Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 671 n.7 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
74. See supra note 40.
75. 207 Cal. App. 3d 566, 568 (1989).
76. See id at 573. The City Hall rotunda continually displays different artistic, ethnic, and
historical exhibits. The Christmas tree standing near the menorah was decorated with ornaments
of varied religious and cultural significance. See id. at 574.
77. See id. at 574.
78. See id. at 577-78.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. 990 F.2d 1518 (1993). Ellis also considered a third cross, a depiction of the Mount He-
lix Cross, which provided "the focal point for one of the City of La Mesa's official insignia." Id.
at 1520. Because it is not a physical display on public land, it will not be addressed in this Note.
82. See id. at 1520.
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and visibility of the display, (3) the inclusion of other religious symbol, (4)
the historical background of the display, and (5) the proximity of the dis-
play to government buildings or religious facilities. ' 3
Both crosses stood atop hills in public parks. The property where the
Mount Helix Cross stood was donated to the city by a private citizen, who
conditioned the conveyance on continued existence of the cross and con-
tinued performance of religious services on Easter Sunday.8 Although a
trust fund was created by the donor to maintain the cross and finance the
services, public funding had been used on occasion for these purposes and
the trust fund was administered by county employees.85 The Mount Helix
Cross is visible from a substantial distance and is illuminated nightly.86 In
fact, the cross is also used as a navigational tool for pilots.8
7
The Mount Soledad Cross, constructed 88 in the 1950s, replaced sev-
eral wooden crosses erected by private citizens and destroyed by vandals. 9
It stands on land owned by the City of San Diego and is visible from a sub-
stantial distance; for example, it can be seen from the nearby interstate
highway.90 The cross was dedicated in 1954 as a war memorial and has
served as a location for secular remembrance ceremonies, and for wed-
dings and baptisms.91 Although the Mount Soledad Memorial Association,
a private group, provided most of the funding for the cross maintenance,
some public funding was also expended.92
The primary case on California's Ban on Aid to Religion Clause is
California Teachers Ass'n v. Riles.93 There, the California Supreme Court
found unconstitutional a statute which permitted the Superintendent of
Public Instruction to lend, without charge, public school textbooks to stu-
dents attending private, sectarian schools.94 The court found that the pro-
gram reduced the cost of books to the schools and thus indirectly furthered
83. Id. at 1524-25.
84. See id. at 1521.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 1520-21.
87. See id.
88. In 1952, the Mount Soledad Memorial Association, a private organization, obtained city
council permission to erect the cross on Mount Soledad. See id. at 1521. The Association super-
vised and paid for the construction of the current 43-foot concrete cross without municipal fund-
ing. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981).
94. See id. at 954, 964.
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the religious purpose of those schools. 95 Consequently, the lending was an
aid to religion.
The program was not a permissible indirect or remote benefit,96 nor
was the provision of textbooks a generalized public service.97 Thus, it
could not be justified on a "child benefit" theory.98 The court concluded
that the statute violated the Ban on Aid to Religion Clause of the Califor-
nia Constitution."
In Hewitt v. Joyner,1"" the Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutional-
ity of San Bernadino County's ownership of the Antone Martin Memorial
Park. The park exclusively contained religious statuaries depicting scenes
from the New Testament.101 Without addressing the federal issues, the
court found that the County's ownership, maintenance, and operation of
the park violated California's Establishment Clase.
°2
The heirs of the owner and sculptor of the statues donated the park to
the County on the condition that the religious statues remain.10 3 Since the
conveyance in 1961, the County had added picnic facilities, parking, and
restrooms 3 4 The County had also printed brochures containing Biblical
passages, and placed advertisements for the park in the telephone direc-
tory.1 5 Further, the Yucca Valley Parks and Recreation District has spent
$5,500 annually on park maintenance, a portion of which was contributed
by the San Bernardino County General Fund.1 6
The court interpreted the California No Preference Clause of article I,
section 4107 to require that "not only may a governmental body not prefer
one religion over another, it also may not appear to be acting preferen-
tially."108 Assuming that the California and Federal Establishment Clauses
are interchangeable, the court borrowed an analogy from Lynch.1 9 The
court concluded that the Antone Martin Memorial Park was unlike a mu-
seum that displays articles of religious importance110 A museum "negates
95. See id. at 957, 963.
96. See id. at 963.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 954.
100. 940 F.2d 1561 (9th Cir. 1991).
101. See id. at 1563.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See supra note 5.
108. Hewitt, 940 F.2d at 1567 (emphasis added).
109. 465 U.S. 688, 692.
110. See Hewitt, 940 F.2d at 1568.
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any message of endorsement of [religious] content.""' San Bernardino
County, however, appeared to endorse the Christian religion through Bibli-
cal brochures and advertisement, and the direct and substantial financial
support of the park with taxpayer dollars. This, the court concluded, vio-
lated California's Establishment, No Preference, and Ban on Aid to Relig-
ion Clauses.112
H. The Ninth Circuit's Inconsistent Analysis in
Carpenter and Alvarado
A. Christian Cross Violates Constitution: Carpenter v. City and County
of San Francisco
The constitutional attack in Carpenter v. City and County of San
Francisco"13 challenged the City's ownership and maintenance of the
Mount Davidson Cross as a violation of the No Preference Clause and the
Ban on Aid to Religion Clause of the California Constitution. These guar-
antees of government neutrality are far more extensive than the federal re-
quirement of separation of church and state. 14 For this reason, and be-
cause of a judicial preference to decide cases under state law,' 15 the Ninth
Circuit did not reach the federal constitutional question.
Mechanically applying the five Ellis factors, 116 the court began by as-
suming that the Mount Davidson Cross had religious significance. The
court did not define "religious" or provide any guidance in determining
whether a particular object might carry "religious significance." Rather,
the Ninth Circuit pointed to the fact that it is a cross, 1 7 that it contained
"Christian relics,""18 and that Christian services were held there, 119 and
concluded that the "cross carries great religious significance. Indeed, to
suggest otherwise would demean this powerful religious symbol.
' 12
At 103 feet tall, the size of the cross was undeniably a factor weighing
against it. The court relied on Hewitt v. Joyner,'21 when considering
111. Id. (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692).
112. See 940 F.2d at 1571.
113. 93 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 1996).
114. See, e.g., Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991) (holding that
religious invocations and benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies are constitu-
tionally impermissible).
115. See, e.g., Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1985).
116. See supra text accompanying note 83.
117. See 93 F.3d at 630.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. 940 F.2d 1561 (9th Cir. 1991) (striking down a religious statuary visible only from
within the park).
whether a religious display must be visible from a great distance beyond a
public park in order to raise constitutional questions. The Hewitt court
concluded that "[w]hether the display is visible to the users of the public
park would seem to be the more relevant inquiry."'2 The court accepted
evidence that the cross was visible from several points around the city.
124
The City submitted a Visibility Study, which "may show that spotting the
Cross is difficult on a foggy day."'l But the court did not find this signifi-
cant. Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain, writing for the court, stated,
"Constitutional guarantees should not depend on the weather, especially in
San Francisco."'
On considering the inclusion of other religious symbols, the third Ellis
factor, the court concluded that "[t]he fact that San Francisco may have
other religious symbols in its art collection spread throughout the City does
not minimize the Cross' effect."1 7 As in Ellis, the court did not look be-
yond the immediate area of the display in determining whether other re-
ligions were sufficiently represented.12 The Mount Davidson Park does
not contain any other symbols, and thus this factor, too, weighed against
the cross.
Supporters of the cross compiled a historical background for the dis-
play, which the court considered under the fourth Ellis factor. 29 Although
the cross had considerable historical significance, its "historical signifi-
cance must be independent of the display's religious content.' 130 The cross
has a copper box embedded in its foundation, a sort of "time capsule,"
which holds newspapers, telephone directories, two Bibles, two rocks from
the garden of Gethsemane, and a jug of water from the Jordan River.13 1 At
the site where the cross now stands, the first Sunrise Easter service was
held under a wooden cross in 1923.32 In 1932, the city gained title to the
122. See 93 F.3d at 631.
123. 1& at631 n.8.
124. See id. at 631.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. Judge O'Scannlain appeared to conclude that religious monuments throughout a
city do not bear upon the constitutionality of any one display. If this is true, then the constitu-
tionality of each of those religious displays would be called into question by the attack on the
first. Further, requiring a city to erect all monuments related to religion in one location might ap-
pear as an endorsement of religion in general over non-religion, also prohibited by the Constitu-
tion. See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (applying the protection of the Establishment
Clause to athiests); cf. Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1526.
129. See 93 F.3d at 631-32.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 628.
132. See id.
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land and created Mount Davidson Park.133 The following year, the city
sought permission to erect a permanent cross, because the wooden crosses
had been repeatedly destroyed by fire, wind, and vandals.134 The City At-
torney concluded that the cross was constitutional under legal principles
applicable at that time.
135
Further, the plaintiffs offered the dedication ceremony in 1933 as evi-
dence of the cross's secular historical significance, where President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt pressed a golden telegraph key in Washington D.C.,
thereby illuminating the cross from our nation's capitol.136  The court
found the event to be intertwined with religious significance, since it took
place on the eve of Palm Sunday to illuminate the cross for Easter week.137
Further, the court found that the cross's longevity was insufficient to create
historical significance and render it a permissible religious display.
13
Considering the final Ellis factor, the court conceded that the display
was far from government buildings or any religious facilities. 139 This last
factor alone, as the court saw it, was insufficient to distinguish the Mount
Davidson Cross from the Mount Helix and Mount Soledad Crosses struck
down in Ellis. 4" Therefore, the court concluded that the Mount Davidson
Cross stood in violation of the No Preference Clause of the California
Constitution.' 4'
In its analysis, the court responded to the plaintiffs' arguments that
the cross should stand because it was a cultural landmark or a piece in San
Francisco's art collection. 42 The court reasoned that the fact that the cross
had become a popular tourist attraction could not "ameliorate [the] viola-
tion of [the No Preference Clause]. If anything, such facts increase the
likelihood of an impermissible appearance of religious preference."'
143
Further, the court dismissed the argument that the cross could "be properly
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. In 1934, the Federal Establishment Clause did not apply to the states and the
California Constitution contained no similar provision. It was not until 1947 that the Supreme
Court held that the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution was applicable to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The California
Establishment Clause was not adopted until 1974, forty years after the Mount davidson Cross was
created.
136. See 93 F.3d at 629.
137. See id. at 631.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 632.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id. (citing Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1525).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
viewed as one of the works of art in [San Francisco's] art collection." 144
The court stated that, "the argument that a religious display is art or a
tourist attraction will not protect the display from restrictions on govern-
ment-sponsored religion which the people of California have put in their
Constitution."
145
B. Statute of Pagan God Does Not Violate the Constitution: Alvarado v.
City of San Jose146
Before analyzing the constitutionality of San Jose's Quetzalc6atl
statue, the Ninth Circuit in Alvarado v. City of San Jose used definitions
from the Third and Seventh Circuits 47 to determine that the statue did not
fall within the definition of "religious."' 148 The Ninth Circuit rephrased its
inquiry as "whether Quetzalc6atl or the Plumed Serpent has current relig-
ious significance." 149 This inquiry focused not on the symbolism or sig-
nificance of the display itself, but whether the religion represented by the
statue has "current religious adherents."' 50 Although there are no cases
holding that a religious belief must be current to merit protection under the
Religion Clauses, the court relied on this assumption as its basis for its
First Amendment analysis.15 1 Despite a long history of worship in Latin
America,152 evidence of existing New Age beliefs and Mormon teachings
which invoke the spirituality of Quetzalc6atl, 153 and a resurgence of the
worship of the ancient deity in southern Mexico, 154 the court concluded
that these beliefs did not "constitute[] a discernible religion" nor did they
meet any definition of "religion." 155 Apparently, the symbol must not only
144. 93 F.3d at 632.
145. Id. (quoting Hewitt, 940 F.2d at 1572).
146. 94 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1996).
147. The Seventh Circuit, in holding that Wiccan beliefs and practices did not constitute a
recognizable "religion" for Establishment purposes, stated "[a] general working definition of re-
ligion for Free Exercise purposes is any set of beliefs addressing matters of 'ultimate concern'
occupying a 'place parallel to that filled by. . . God' in traditionally religious persons."
Fleischfresser v. Directors Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688 n.5 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970)).
The Third Circuit held that the Science of Creative Intelligence Transcendental Meditation
was a religion since "[rieligion, as comprehended by the First Amendment now includes mere
affirmation of belief in a supreme being .... invocation of a supreme being .... and reading
verses from the Bible without comment." Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 199 (3rd Cir. 1979).
148. 94 F.3d at 1227-28.
149. Id. at 1227.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 1226.
153. See id. at 1229-31.
154. See id. at 1231.
155. Id. at 1232-33.
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have current religious adherents, but also they must be the type that a fed-
eral judge would consider significant.
The Ninth Circuit refused in Alvarado to adhere to its own procedures
for adjudicating federal cases involving state constitutional issues.1 56 Fed-
eral constitutional issues should be avoided when state constitutional law
is available as an alternative ground. 157 Despite this established rule, and
the alleged "non-religious" nature of the statue, the court undertook a cur-
sory Federal Establishment Clause analysis based on Lemon and Lynch.158
The court found "not even a shadow of a threat that the City has advanced
religion" and held that the statue did not violate the Federal Constitu-
tion. 1
59
Further, even though the No Preference Clause of the California Con-
stitution has been found more protectiye of separation of church and state
than the Federal Establishment Clause,16° the court did nothing more than
quote the California No Preference Clause and conclude that San Jose did
not prefer one religion over another, or appear to do so.
161
I. Toward a More Consistent Approach: Melding the Various
Tests into One
The disparate results obtained in Carpenter and Alvarado call for a
stricter standard of analysis than that applied by the Ninth Circuit. The
court in one instance tore down a Christian cross by applying a single
"controlling" case, and in the next instance upheld the statue of an ancient
deity by burying it beneath philosophical discussions regarding the defimi-
tion of religion and a loose application of the Federal Constitution.
The various constitutional clauses do not compel or permit courts to
become vehicles for societal affirmative action, bestowing suspect classifi-
cation on minority religious symbols while applying a nearly per se test to
symbols of popular religions.162 The proper analysis should take a com-
156. See, e.g., Hewitt, 940 F.2d at 1565.
157. See id.; see also Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1985).
158. See 94 F.3d at 1231-32.
159. Id. at 1232.
160. See, e.g., Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 847 (Cal. 1991) ("The
Attorney General has emphasized the broad scope of the preference clause: 'It would be difficult
to imagine a more sweeping statement of the principle of governmental impartiality in the field of
religion' [than that found in the 'no preference' clause and] [o]ur case law has also recognized
the strength of this clause, and acknowledged that in some instances it might warrant a separation
of church and state more strict than that called for in the federal Constitution.") (quoting 25 Ops.
Cal. Att'y Gen. 316, 319 (1955) and citing Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663 (Cal.
1978)).
161. See 94 F.3d at 1233.
162. For a provocative analysis, see Jesse H. Choper, Colloquy: Religion and Race Under
the Constitution: Similarities and Differences, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1994).
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prehensive view of the symbol and the context in which it appears.163 This
type of analysis would promote equal treatment of religions and therefore
tolerance of diversity.
The analysis must begin with a threshold determination of the relig-
ious nature of the symbol. This "religious nature" should be determined
through a workable def'mition164 "that goes beyond the closely bounded
limits of theism, and accounts for the multiplying forms of recognizably
legitimate religious exercise." 165 When a court attempts to define religion
by drawing analogies to commonly accepted faiths, the definition unduly
limits the concept of religion. By focusing on the externalities of a belief
system 66 such as the faith's age, its apparent social value, political ele-
ments, number of adherents and the demands made on them, the consis-
tency of practice among members, and outward trappings such as scrip-
tures, prayers and organizational structures, this definition unduly restricts
the concept of religion.
67
The Jeffersonian "wall of separation" between church and state is not
absolute.1 68 In expounding upon the original intent to accommodate relig-
ious beliefs, the Supreme Court noted in Lynch that, "[iut is clear that nei-
ther the 17 draftsmen of the Constitution nor the Congress of 1789, saw
any establishment problem in the employment of congressional chaplains
to offer daily prayers in Congress, a practice that has continued for nearly
two centuries. ' 169 Because the Establishment Clauses of the United States
and California Constitutions prohibit the "establishment" of religion, a
finding that a display on public land has religious character cannot be de-
terminative. Finding that an object falls into the definition of "religious" is
not enough to render it unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court
has never required total separation of church and state.1 70 "No significant
segment of our society and no institution within it can exist in a vacuum or
163. For a comprehensive approach, see JESSE H. CHOPER, ENDANGERING RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
RELIGION CLAUSES (1995).
164. On the difficulty of defining religion, see generally Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Relig-
ion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL L. REv. 579; Note, Defining "Religion" in the First
Amendment: A Functional Approach. 74 CORNELL L. REv. 532 (1989); Val D. Ricks, To God
God's, To Caesar Caesar's, and to Both the Defining of Religion, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1053
(1993).
165. TRIBE, supra note 50, § 14-16 at 1180.
166. See id. at 1181.
167. See id. at 1181-82.
168. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (citing 8 JEFF. WORKS, 113).
169. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,674 (1984).
170. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 314-15 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,211 (1948).
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in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, much less from gov-
emment."
, 71
Although a symbol's purpose need not be exclusively secular, the ab-
sence of any clear secular intent would likely offend each of the Estab-
lishment Clauses.172 However, secular intent has been and should continue
to be broadly defined by the courts, to include education, representation of
segments of a community, preservation of historical and cultural relics, and
promotion of civic aesthetics.
The display must neither advance nor inhibit religion in its primary
effect.173 The government should not endorse nor appear to endorse any
particular religion, 174 neither should it disapprove nor appear to disapprove
of any religion. The size and visibility of the display should be considered
together when assessing the impact of the display. But neither characteris-
tic should be dispositive. If there exists a city-wide art collection which
includes representations of various religious symbols, the symbols should
have the same fate. If one religious symbol in a collection is found uncon-
stitutional, then it would follow that the others are also prima facie uncon-
stitutional. The scope of the search for other symbols should extend be-
yond the immediate area where the one symbol is found to determine if,
city-wide, one religion is being preferred over another. Thus, the existence
of other symbols from different religions mollifies the individual impact of
each display. The location of a display can also give the appearance that
the government is endorsing a religion, and should also be considered. A
religious display atop city hall might appear as governmental endorsement
of a religion, while one located in a large park along with other attractions
might not.
The public religious display must not foster an excessive entangle-
ment with religion. 75 The line should not be crossed by de minimis finan-
cial allocations of tax revenue, as long as symbols of one faith are not dis-
proportionately found in the absence of symbols of other faiths.
California's Ban on Aid Clause prohibits financial assistance in all forms
to religious causes. The language of the provision clearly expresses the
171. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673.
172. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (stating that "a statute that is motivated
in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first [Lemon] criterion."); see also Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,
335 (1987) (suggesting that the inquiry does not mean "that the law's purpose be unrelated to
religion" rather, "[the requirement of secular purpose] aims at preventing the relevant govern-
mental decisonmaker ... from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a
particular point of view in religious matters.").
173. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,243 (1968)).
174. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
175. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664,674 (1970)).
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intent to grant no public monies in furtherance of any particular religion.
This clause cannot be read to forbid any government money from ever
reaching a religious group, but rather, that government money may not
further or aid in the group's religious purpose. By maintaining a statue or
a cross on public land, the government does not necessarily further the ef-
forts of any particular faith. In fact, illumination of a symbol with relig-
ious connotations would not necessarily show a preference, as long as it
does not occur only in conjunction with specific religious events. The City
of San Francisco pays to illuminate the Golden Gate Bridge, Coit Tower,
and other tourist attractions during night-time hours. The content of a
tourist attraction should not determine whether it is adequately maintained
or illuminated. In fact, lighting some symbols and leaving others dark
could appear as government disapproval of a particular religion and offend
the Establishment Clauses.
Political devisiveness should be an important factor in deciding these
cases. In San Jose, where the Nativity was pulled and the Meso-American
God was not, the community was torn by the message of intolerance. 76 In
San Francisco, where a diverse array of religious and spiritual monuments
exist,177 the cross should not fall alone.
In keeping with the No Preference Clause of the California Constitu-
tion, the government should not grant a preference to any religion over an-
other. The inclusion of all religious symbols is not necessary, but a variety
of symbols from different faiths and cultures would protect the city against
claims of granting preference to one religion.
One last factor that should be considered is the existence of a dis-
claimer on the religious display. Mandating disclaimers on religious dis-
176. For social commentary on the conflict, see Jamie Beckett, San Jose Pulls Nativity
Scene, Stirs New Fight, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 1, 1994, at A-5 ("If we're going to
be a community of diversity, let's include Christians .... Either you have to remove religion
from public areas, or... you should include everybody."); Praise and Protest as Quetzalcdatl
Statue Unveiled. Aztec dances, Picket Signs in San Jose Park, S. F. CHRON., Nov. 19, 1994, at
B10 (Quoting one anti-abortion protestor as stating, "This shows arrogance and ignorance of the
fact that babies were sacrificed to Quetzalcoatl.").
177. The City of San Francisco, whose name itself derives from a saint, maintains numerous
religious and spiritual attractions, among others: a Pagoda and Japanese Tea Garden, a statue of
Buddha, a Holocaust Memorial, a Madonna, an Aztec mural and sites for a Sikh religious proces-
sion, a pagan prayer gathering, and a children's candlelight vigil. See Steve Albert, S.F.'s Cross
Examination; City Facing Constitutional Attack on Mount Davidson Cross Before Ninth Circuit,
THE RECORDER, Nov. 15, 1994, at 1. One wonders if these have not been challenged because
they are politically correct markers which celebrate our new constitutional value of multicultur-
alism.
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plays on public property178 would avoid the appearance of a governmental
"stamp of approval" on the religious message of the display while allowing
the display to stand. In conjunction, the court could offer a shifting burden
of proof. When a government actor fails to take affirmative steps to dis-
claim endorsement of an arguably religious display on public property, the
burden should fall on the government to prove the constitutionality of the
display.1 79
IV. Applying a Comprehensive Analysis to
Carpenter and Alvarado
The Ninth Circuit allowed the serpent god statue to stand in com-
memoration of the Latino community of San Jose, while it struck down the
Latin cross atop Mt. Davidson. While the "religious" nature of each sym-
bol may not be equal in degree, the application of relevant constitutional
provisions should be the same. Otherwise, judicially-designated "insig-
nificant" religions will be afforded constitutional protections that more es-
tablished religions are not; that is not what the constitutional protections
suggest.
A. Do the Symbols Have Religious Significance?
Whether either of the two displays can be subjected to religion clause
scrutiny depends on the definition of "religious." The Supreme Court has
not developed a clear standard, but it is generally agreed that it should be
broadly defimed.180 The Latin cross is generally regarded as religious, 81
but the statue, while less recognized, is also religious. Visitors to the
statue made offerings of flowers and food. They "made obeisance" to the
statute and burned incense. School students took part in a ceremonial pro-
cession to the sculpture. One observer left a card bearing the following
works:
0 Dei Quetzac6atl
May your many feathers loft our
diverse souls across the chasm of religious artifice. 82
178. See Recent Case, Establishment Clause - Religious Displays on Public Property - Colo-
rado Supreme Court Upholds Display of Ten Commandments on Public Property - State v.
Freedom From Religion Foundation, 109 HARV. L. REV. 530,530 (1995).
179. See id.
180. See supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
181. A Latin Cross placed in the Statehouse plaza in Columbus, Ohio by the Ku Klux Klan
was found to be a religious display in Capitol Square Review v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
182. Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1996).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
B. Do the Symbols Establish Religion in Primary Effect?
Neither the Mount Davidson Cross nor Quetzalc6atl have the primary
effect of establishing a religion. Neither explicitly calls for people to ad-
here to any particular faith. The Quetzalc6atl statue standing in a park
does not establish a religion. Although the cross is more recognizably re-
ligious than the statue of Quetzalc6atl, its primary purpose was not to es-
tablish or further a religion, but to make permanent the private efforts to
erect a cross atop Mount Davidson for secular as well as sectarian pur-
poses. The fact that San Francisco's Art Commission was consulted on the
design shows that the cross was more than a religious symbol.
18 3
C. Do the Symbols Have a Secular Purpose?
Because a broad spectrum of combined secular and religious motives
are constitutionally acceptable, both monuments have a secular purpose.
The Mount Davidson Cross has independent historical significance, 184 and
the Quetzalc6atl statue represents Latino contributions to the San Jose
community.
D. Do the Symbols Either Advance or Inhibit Religion?
The purpose of the cross was not to advance religion. It exists as both
a secular and a sectarian monument, since the design for the Mount David-
son Cross was approved by the city's art commission. Although tall and
large, most of the cross is concealed by surrounding trees in a 40-acre park,
far from any government buildings.18 5 Furthermore, San Francisco main-
tains various symbols representing different faiths throughout the city.
The Quetzalc6atl statue, although smaller, is prominently displayed in
a downtown city park. San Jose had enormouns discretion in determining
how to represent the various ethnic groups that contributed to the city. It
chose, however, to commemorate a pagan deity by spending $500,000 to
erect a new statue of an ancient god, in the face of citizen protest and in
spite of the amended provisions of the California Constitution. 186 For this
reason, the statue presents a greater appearance of government endorse-
ment.18
7
183. See Carpenter v. City and County of San Francisco, 803 F. Supp. 337, 348 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
184. See id.
185. The Mount Davidson Cross should nonetheless wear a disclaimer because of the com-
monly recognized religious message it carries.
186. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
187. Of course, San Jose could mitigate the appearance of endorsement by placing a promi-
nent disclaimer on the Quetzalc6atl statue.
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E. Is there Excessive Governmental Entanglement?
Entanglement has traditionally been assessed in terms of either ad-
ministrative entanglement or political devisiveness. 88 Neither display de-
mands any ongoing administrative entanglement of the respective cities
with any religion. The courts should have considered the amount of money
spent in proportion to other monuments and tourist attractions. Spending
public money to maintain religious displays would be inappropriate if dis-
proportionately high. The district court found that no money is expended
to maintain the cross.18 9 The land where the cross stands is still owned by
the City of San Francisco and used regularly by residents as a recreational
site. On the other hand, Quetzalc6atl was publicly funded with $500,000.
Both the Mount Davidson Cross and the Quetzalc6atl statue have provoked
serious political divisiveness as evidenced by the lawsuits under discus-
sion. But litigation over a display should not be determinative, otherwise
any individual or group could decide the constitutionality of a display
merely by filing suit against the government. Further, complaints aimed
solely at the allocation of tax dollars should not be persuasive unless re-
ligion is involved.
F. Does the Government Grant a Preference to a Religion Through
these Displays?
San Francisco maintains several religious and spiritual displays on
public land. By displaying many religions common to its citizens, it is not
granting a preference to any one faith. However, in San Jose, the media
focused on the voluntary removal of the Nativity scene from a Christmas
display including many secular symbols and the adamant decision to go
forward with plans to erect the Quetzalc6atl statute. Generally, mainte-
nance is less trouble than removal or creation. Maintaining the cross, an
obvious religious symbol, is arguably no worse than creating the statue of
Quetzalc6atl, which is less obviously religious.
Spending a minimal amount of public money to maintain the Mount
Davidson Cross, a recognized religious symbol, is no worse than spending
a larger amount to erect a statue of Quetzalc6atl, a little-known, but still
religious symbol. The courts should not look at just one factor, but rather,
at the entire context to determine the constitutionality of a religious display
on public land.
188. See Harry Simon, Note, Rebuilding the Wall Between Church and State: Public Spon-
sorship of Religious Displays Under the Federal and California Constitutions, 37 HASTINGS L.
J. 499, 504 (1986) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-15).
189. See Carpenter, 803 F. Supp. at 345.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Conclusion
Application of a comprehensive test suggests that the cross in Car-
penter and the statue of Quetzalc6atl in Alvarado should both be permitted
to remain on public property, or they should both come down.19° In our in-
creasingly divided communities, we need reminders that tolerance is a
virtue.
As Justice Douglas observed in Zorach v. Clausen,'9 1 "We are a re-
ligious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.'' 192 This
notwithstanding, the courts should recognize the historical contribution re-
ligious groups have made to this nation. Just as the Latino culture has
benefitted the City of San Jose, Christians have also contributed to this
country, to the extent that San Francisco was founded by Father Francisco
Palou as a Catholic mission in 1776, and named after Saint Francis of As-
sisi.193 Both groups have improved this state, and the nation, through their
unique presence.
The decisions reached under current Religion Clause analysis leave
much to be desired in both method and result. The Supreme Court, in de-
nying certiorari in the Carpenter case, has left our courts drifting in a mo-
rass of clumsy, unworkable standards for these cases. 194 Although this is a
highly sensitive area, the courts should not so easily avoid finding a com-
prehensive analysis to end the arbitrary and conflicting outcomes.
Among San Francisco's most beloved personalities, the late Herb
Caen had this to say about the recent decision:
THE LAW is the law and the law is an arse. I refer of course to the
Mount Davidson cross, apparently doomed by those who see it as
something insidious rather than an eloquent landmark loved even by
atheists.... Separation of church and state is a must! So is judg-
ment and intelligence.
195
We can only hope that in the future the courts will incorporate more
judgment and intelligence while upholding the separation of church and
state.
190. For a commentary on the non-preferential accommodationist and strict separatist ap-
proaches to Religion Clause analysis, see John Witte, Jr., Essay: The Theology and Politics of the
First Amendment Religion Clauses: A Bicentennial Essay, 40 EMORY L. J. 489 (1991).
191. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
192. Id. at 313.
193. See TOM COLE, A SHORT HISTORY OF SAN FRANCISCO 15 (1981).
194. But cf. Simon, supra note 188 (examining the divergence between federal and California
law on government aid to religion and advocating the adoption of California law as a model for
greater protection against state-sponsored religious displays).
195. Herb Caen, Poor Herbert's Almanac, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 29, 1996, at Cl.
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